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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of trade liberalization on the demand for 
female workers using Indonesia’s tariff reduction in the 1990s and 2000s as a natural 
experiment. This paper utilizes variation in output and input tariffs to examine two 
different channels through which trade liberalization affects female employment: 
import competition and imported technology. We find that a 10%-point reduction in 
output and input tariffs hurt women’s employment by 0.5% point and 4.5% point, 
respectively, in light industries in the 1990s. We show that output tariffs affect 
women’s employment in a competitive industry, while input tariffs increase firms’ 
utilization of foreign inputs instead of domestic inputs. We also find that output 
tariffs encourage women’s employment in heavy industry, while input tariffs have 
hurt women’s employment in heavy industry since 2000. Our results suggest that 
there exists a race between gender inequality in education and imported technology 
in developing countries. 
 
Keywords: trade liberalization; gender inequality; skill-biased technological change 
JEL Classification Codes: F14, F66, J16, J24, 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
* We thank the Japan Society for Promotion of Science for financial support under the Young Scientist (B) 
Grant (#16K17113). We thank Jong-Wha Lee, Stephan Litschig, participants of the RIEM-IDDPRP Workshop 
of Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and 
Organization of University of Tokyo, and 2017 Singapore Economic Review Conference. 
†  National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-8677. Email: 
yoko.oishi.1121@grips.ac.jp 
‡ Corresponding author. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 
106-8677. Email: wie-dainn@grips.ac.jp. Tel.: +81-3-64396168. 
 1 
1. Introduction 
The rapid globalization over the last three decades has motivated a rich body of 
literature investigating the distributional impacts of international trade in labor markets. 
Although many recent studies have focused on the differential impact of international 
trade across male and female workers, there is currently no consensus regarding this 
impact in the empirical or theoretical literature. Becker (1957) argued that heightened 
competition increases the demand for female workers because it drives out costly 
discrimination towards minority workers, including females. On the other hand, Standing 
(1999) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) claimed that through growing cost-cutting 
competition, globalization has made firms seek female workers, who earn low wages and 
engage in irregular employment. 
Trade is also an important channel of technological adoption for developing 
countries. Wood (19995) and Acemoglu (2003) showed that trade liberalization creates 
incentives for firms to adopt new technologies through imported machinery from 
technologically advanced countries. Galor and Weil (1996) and Juhn et al. (2014) 
suggested that new capital is more complementary to female blue-collar workers because 
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new technologies embedded in physical capital involve computerized production 
processes and weaken the relative advantage of male workers. 
On the other hand, Acemoglu (2003) noted that the transfer of new technology 
may encourage skill-biased technological change in developing countries. Technological 
change in many countries is found to favor skilled workers and to raise their wage 
premium. Katz and Murphy (1992) and Berman et al. (1998) also showed that 
technological change is pervasive among developed countries because of international 
trade. If most female workers are unskilled, the transfer of new technology driven by 
trade liberalization will decrease the demand for female workers. 
In this paper, we employ both output tariffs and input tariffs calculated at the 
four-digit industry level in Indonesia’s manufacturing sector to disentangle the effect of 
import competition and the effect of imported input induced by trade liberalization. A 
reduction in output tariffs increases domestic competition as the price of imported goods 
becomes cheaper. At the same time, a reduction in input tariffs encourages firms to 
employ more imported intermediate goods. We use firm-level data from Indonesia’s 
manufacturing sector from 1993 to 2008, when Indonesia implemented comprehensive 
and gradual reductions in tariff rates mainly because of pressure from foreign countries. 
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Our empirical evidence shows that trade tends to hurt women employment 
especially through imported inputs. Further investigation shows that the impact of trade 
liberalization in Indonesia coincides with the story of skill-biased technological changes 
especially in light industry traditionally hired more women. On average, a 10%-point 
decline in output tariffs decreases women’s employment share by 0.8% point, while a 
10%-point decrease in input tariffs decreases this share by approximately 3.6% point in 
our baseline estimation. Then, we show that the impact of input tariffs is salient among 
production workers in light industry. The direction of the impact of output tariff changes 
when we restrict our sample to firms in previously male-dominated heavy industry. 
Then, we further explore the mechanism of output and input tariffs. This exercise 
shows that the impact of output tariffs appears only in competitive industries, as measured 
by the Herfindahl index. An industry that experiences higher-than-average firm exits 
could avoid the impact of output tariffs. The impact of output tariffs through non-
production workers’ employment and skill premium is estimated to be limited. However, 
we find that a reduction in input tariffs significantly decreases a firm’s utilization of 
domestic inputs and increases its utilization of foreign inputs. This implies that foreign 
advanced technology embedded in imported inputs favors male workers over female 
workers. 
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Our presented evidence is different from empirical findings in previous literature 
as we examine different context of trade liberalization. Black and Brainerd (2004) and 
Ederington et al. (2009) examined the impact of increased competition on women’s 
employment in the United States and Colombia. Both articles found that increased 
competition driven by trade liberalization improves the gender wage gap in the United 
States, and leads Colombian firms to hire more female workers. Gaddis and Pieters (2012) 
examined regional variation in tariff reductions in Brazil and found that trade 
liberalization increases female employment in the trade and service sectors. Juhn et al. 
(2014) examined export and input tariffs at the disaggregated industry level in Mexico 
and provided empirical evidence that a reduction in export tariffs leads firms to enter 
export markets. These exporter firms update their technology and replace male blue-collar 
workers with female blue-collar workers. 
We conjecture that difference between previous literature and our findings 
comes from difference in the measure of trade liberalization and the context of trade 
liberalization. The measure of trade liberalization employed in this paper is import tariff 
on final goods and intermediate goods, thereby all the evidence should be interpreted as 
the impact of increased importation. Also, empirical investigation shows that Indonesia’s 
trade liberalization enlarged country’s import of foreign final goods and intermediate 
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inputs without encouraging country’s export activity. Second, we examine Indonesia, 
which has the 4th largest population in the world and a relatively large educational gap 
between women and men. This gap was especially large in the 1990s. Thus, Indonesia 
provides an appropriate context for us to examine how trade liberalization affects female 
workers due to their skill level as well as labor market discrimination. 
Our findings are consistent with findings from previous literature on Indonesia 
and its trade liberalization. Studies have examined Indonesia’s trade liberalization and the 
demand for skilled workers. Amiti and Konnings (2007) found, using plant-level data 
from Indonesia in the 1990s, that imported technology driven by a reduction in input 
tariffs increases productivity. Amiti and Cameron (2012) also found that reducing import 
tariffs on intermediate goods decreases the wage premium of non-production workers. 
Lee and Wie (2015) examined Indonesia in the 2000s and provided empirical evidence 
that technology-embedded imported material increases the demand for skilled workers. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the background of 
Indonesia’s trade liberalization and provide a detailed explanation of our data 
construction. In section 3, we present our data, our empirical specification and our 
baseline estimation. In section 4, we explore possible channels through which trade 
liberalization affects the demand for female workers. In section 5, we examine the 
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robustness of our results and use alternative specifications and tariff measures. We 
conclude in section 5. 
2. Trade Liberalization in Indonesia   
2.1. Changes in Trade Policy in Indonesia 
 Benefitting from an increase in the oil price during the 1970s, the Indonesian 
government implemented an import substitution strategy to support domestic industries 
(Soesastro and Basri 2005). In the early 1980s, the price of oil started to fall, and the 
government initiated comprehensive trade liberalization to improve the competitiveness 
of domestic firms and the marketability of their exports. However, these efforts to 
promote trade liberalization slowed in the late 1980s due to resistance from the agriculture, 
motor vehicles, plastic, and cement sectors (Feridhanusetyawan and Pangestu, 2003). 
 In the 1990s, trade liberalization gained momentum under pressures mostly from 
foreign countries. In January 1992, members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) agreed to the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
and chose 15 commodities for fast-track tariff reduction.4 In 1995, Indonesia joined the 
                                                          
4 For fast-track products with tariffs higher than 20%, the tariff on the commodities would 
be immediately reduced to 20%. They promised that the upper bar would be further 
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World Trade Organization (WTO), and the government announced a comprehensive 
tariff reduction target of 10% by 2003 for all industries except motor vehicles. In 1995, 
Ministry of Trade also announced the commitment to removing non-tariff barriers on 12 
commodities, including iron and steel products, within ten years.   
 After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Indonesia agreed to the IMF’s structural 
adjustment program. The January 1998 reform package included a gradual 5-10% point 
reduction in import tariffs on chemical, iron, steel, and fishery products (Soesastro and 
Basri, 1998). In addition to that structural reform program, the government announced a 
reduction in tariffs on motor vehicles and their components in July 1999 
(Feridhanusetyawan and Pangestu 2003). Indonesia also removed other trade barriers 
such as non-tariff barriers. Most of the IMF program was implemented at the beginning. 
However, the government backtracked for a few sensitive sectors, such as rice, sugar, 
steel and logs (WTO 2003).  
In the 2000s, Indonesia continued to reduce trade constraints (WTO 2013). The 
average Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff declined from 9.9% in 2004 to 9.5% in 2006. 
                                                          
decreased to below 5% within ten years. For commodities with tariff rates of 20% or less, 
tariffs should be reduced to 0-5% within seven years. 
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Additionally, more than 93% of the tariff lines were bound, which reduced uncertainty 
regarding the tariff change in the short run. More than 75% of tariff rates were in the 
range of zero to 10% in 2006. 
 
2.2. Construction of Output and Input Tariffs 
To construct the data on output and input tariffs, we utilized the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Trade Analysis Information System 
(TRAINS), the Commodity Trade (UN Comtrade) Database, and Indonesia’s Input-
Output Table in three different years: 1995, 2000, and 2005. TRAINS provides detailed 
tariff rates within the 9-digit HS code during our sample period. We used only MFN tariff 
rates, which countries promise to impose on imports from other members of the WTO 
unless the country is part of other preferential trade agreements, such as in free trade areas 
or customs unions. Then, we calculated the simple average of tariffs within the 6-digit 
HS code, which is matched to the volume of imports from UN Comtrade, to calculate the 
weighted average tariffs within the 4-digit ISIC code. The weighted tariffs within the 4-
digit ISIC code serve as our output tariffs for each firm. We utilized several concordances 
across the generation of HS codes and between HS codes and ISIC codes. The utilization 
 9 
of such concordances5 may decrease the accuracy of the output and input tariffs and cause 
attenuation bias in our estimation. 
 We employed three waves of input-output (IO) tables in 1995, 2000, and 2005 
provided by BPS (Statistics Indonesia) to calculate input tariffs. The most detailed IO 
table is disaggregated by 172 sectors. We created concordance between sector codes 
within IO tables and 4-digit ISIC codes. Then, we matched tariff rates in 1990-1997 to 
the IO table in 1995, tariff rates in 1998-2003 to the IO table in 2000, and tariff rates in 
2004-2009 to the IO table in 2005. Then, we calculated the input tariff within the 4-digit 
ISIC code weighted by input shares. We provide a detailed description of the tariff data 
construction in the appendix. 
<Table 1 to be inserted here> 
 Table 1 shows the evolution of output and input tariffs aggregated at the two-digit 
industry level. It shows significant variations in both tariffs across industries and over 
time. Both output tariffs and input tariffs sharply decreased in the 1990s. In the 2000s, 
                                                          
5 Annual Manufacturing Survey Indonesia employs industry codes based on ISIC rev2 
and rev3. However, this industry code cannot be perfectly matched with ISIC codes. 
Approximately 30% of firms are dropped from our analyzed sample due to this problem.  
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most output tariffs gradually declined, while most input tariffs bounced back in the early 
2000s and gradually increased until 2008. 
It is possible that certain industries are more powerful in demanding government 
trade protection. Governments also have incentives to provide political favors by means 
of trade policy. To prevent any endogeneity caused by this industry-government 
connection, we include 4-digit industry fixed effects in all of our analyses. 
 
3. Annual Manufacturing Survey and Empirical Results 
3.1 Annual Manufacturing Survey 
 Indonesia’s Annual Manufacturing Survey contains detailed information on all 
manufacturing firms in Indonesia with twenty or more employees. Each survey contains 
around 20,000 observations and provides information on each firm’s wage bills, import 
and export status, main product, amount of fixed capital, and imported and domestic input 
materials. Information on employees’ gender and worker class (production/non-
production worker) is only available from the survey after 1993. Additionally, the data in 
the 1990s have a panel structure, which allows researchers to keep track of each firm over 
the years; however, the data collected in the 2000s do not provide such a unique firm 
identifier.  
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<Table 2 to be inserted here> 
  Table 2 provides the share of women’s employment across two-digit industries. 
Overall, women’s employment share in the manufacturing sector was 39.6% in 1993, 
remained almost the same until 2000, and slightly increased in the 2000s, reaching 
41.6% in 2009. The disaggregated trends in Table 2 show that women are mostly hired 
in the food and beverages or textile industries. However, there was little change within 
each industry and each industry’s employment share in the whole manufacturing sector. 
<Table 3 to be inserted here> 
  Table 3 shows summary statistics of firm characteristics in 1993, 2000, and 2008. 
It shows that the share of non-production workers’ wage bill slightly decreased from 
0.245 in 1993 to 0.195 in 2008, while the share of non-production workers remained at 
a similar level during the same period. Firm size, measured as the number of employees, 
decreased from 247.13 in 1993 to 177.98, while firms’ output and value added per 
worker both increased. The usage of both domestic and imported material per worker 
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slightly increased over our sample period. However, the share of importers6 sharply 
declined from 19.05% in 1993 to 13.50% in 2008. The share of firms that exported their 
product also slightly declined from 19.88% in 1993 to 17.61% in 2008. 
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
 We analyze the impact of trade liberalization on the firm-level female employment 
share using the following specification. For firm i in industry k in year t, the female 
employment share 𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑘 is estimated as follows: 
 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑇𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑇𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛽3(𝐼𝑇𝑡
𝑘 × 𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑘) + 𝛿1𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑘
+ 𝜉𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜃𝑘 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑘  (1) 
 
where 𝑂𝑇𝑡
𝑘 and 𝐼𝑇𝑡
𝑘 represent output tariffs and input tariffs, respectively, calculated at 
the 4-digit industry level. Both tariff rates are deflated by ten, so the estimated coefficient 
represents a 10%-point change in tariff rates on the demand for female workers. The 
                                                          
6 A firm is categorized as an importing firm if imported material accounts for more than 
10% of its total intermediate goods. A firm is categorized as an exporter if it was reported 
to export any positive share of its output.  
 13 
coefficient for input tariffs is expected to capture any spillover effects of input tariffs on 
firms that do not import, while that for the interaction term between input tariffs and the 
importer dummy variable (𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ) represents the direct impact of input tariffs on importing 
firms. Indicators for exporters (𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑘  ) and importers (𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑘  ) are included to identify 
differences between international and domestic firms. The set of control variables 
includes the number of employees, the real fixed capital per worker, the real value added 
per worker, and the real output per worker. 
  
3.3 Baseline Estimation Results 
 Table 4 demonstrates our baseline results from the estimation of equation (1). In 
regression (1), output tariffs show a moderate positive impact on female employment: a 
10%-point decrease in output tariffs decreases the female employment share by 0.8% 
point. The magnitude of the impact is moderate; however, the results are consistent across 
different specifications in regressions (1)-(4). The positive relationship between output 
tariffs and the female employment share suggests that higher import competition may 
cause de-feminization in the manufacturing sector rather than driving out costly 
discrimination against women. 
<Table 4 to be inserted here> 
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 The impact of input tariffs on importing firms shows a consistent and stronger 
impact of trade liberalization: a 10%-point decrease in input tariffs is associated with a 
3.6%-point decline in the share of women’s employment in importing firms in regressions 
(1) and (2) in Table 4. The impact of the input tariff is consistent across regressions (3) 
and (4) when we control for firm characteristics and the post-crisis period indicator. The 
coefficient of input tariffs is estimated to be insignificant, implying that there was no 
meaningful spillover effect on non-importing firms. 
 In regression (5), we employ non-weighted tariffs7 as our alternative measure of 
trade liberalization. The coefficient on output tariffs becomes insignificant; however, the 
impact of input tariffs remains significant with a slightly reduced magnitude. In this 
specification, we can also see that non-importing firms were affected by changes in the 
input tariff, as well. 
 Table 4 also shows that exporting firms hired 5.4%-5.9% point more female 
workers. These results are consistent with findings from earlier studies that export-
oriented firms in developing countries tend to hire more female workers due to their low 
wages and labor-intensive but low skills in those exporting industries (Berik, 2000; Ozler, 
2000, and Standing 1999). 
                                                          
7 Please see the appendix for the construction of the non-weighted tariff measure.  
 15 
<Table 5 to be inserted here> 
 In Table 5, we re-estimated equation (1) by the type of worker (non-production 
and production workers) and type of industry (light and heavy industry). The reason for 
this exercise is to examine whether the impact of trade liberalization differs by the skill 
level of workers, the preference for female workers, and the capital intensity of firms. In 
previous literature, non-production workers hired in manufacturing sectors are considered 
to be highly skilled and work at the management level rather than in production operations. 
Light industry tends to produce final goods rather than intermediate goods such as food 
and textiles. Such industries are also the main source of demand for less skilled female 
workers in developing countries. 
 Regressions (1) and (2) in Table 5 show that a decline in output tariffs moderately 
decreases women’s employment share among both non-production workers and 
production workers. On the other hand, the input tariff only affects the share of women’s 
employment among production workers of a much larger size. 
  In regression (3), we estimated equation (1) using a subsample of firms belonging 
to light industry, such as food, textile, and furniture. It shows that a 10%-point reduction 
in output tariffs and input tariffs would result in a decreases of 1.0% point and 2.1% point, 
respectively, in women’s employment share. In regression (4), we employed firms 
 16 
belonging to the metal, machine, transportation, chemical and electrical industries. The 
results show that a 10%-point reduction in output tariffs increases the demand for female 
workers in heavy industries by 1.0% point, while input tariffs have no impact on the share 
of female workers. In regression (5) and (6), we categorized firms by their capital intensity, 
and the results indicated that input tariff reductions reduce women’s employment share 
only in labor-intensive firms; this finding is consistent with the results of firms in light 
industries. 
 Table 5 provides results indicating that a decrease in input tariffs also decreases 
the share of female production workers in light industry, which traditionally favors female 
workers. Indonesia import intermediate goods from developed countries, which are 
embedded with advanced foreign technology. Female workers in Indonesia are on average 
less educated than their male counterparts and tend to work in lower-skilled, repetitive 
and routine jobs (Lee and Wie 2015; Newhouse and Suryadarma 2009). Our empirical 
evidence implies that foreign technology hurts the employment of less-skilled female 
production workers in industries that used to provide a majority of jobs for women. We 
also have some empirical evidence that increased domestic competition hurts women’s 
employment as well, but the estimated size of the impact is very small.  
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4. The Mechanism of Trade Liberalization  
 In this section, we further examine why trade liberalization negatively affects the 
female employment share, especially through input tariffs. The previous section provides 
some evidence suggesting that imported skills and imported competition favor male 
workers, who are on average more educated than female workers, especially in light 
industry. In subsection 4.1, we explore mechanisms through which output tariffs affect 
the relative demand for female workers: competition, firm exit, and industry-level output 
decline. In subsection 4.2, we further explore potential channels through which input 
tariffs hurt women’s employment, such as skill upgrading and imported foreign inputs.  
 
4.1 Competition, Firm Exit, and Output Decline  
 In this subsection, restrict our sample to firms in light industry because trade 
liberalization hurts female workers mostly in firms in light industry. In regression (1) of 
Table 6, we included the interaction term between output tariffs and the indicator for the 
Herfindahl index lower than 0.25 within 4-digit industries. The Herfindahl index is often 
employed in the literature as a measure of competition in an industry. The index ranges 
from 0 to 1, indicating a range from a huge number of small firms to a single monopolistic 
producer. Regression (1) shows that the impact of output tariffs is salient only among 
 18 
firms in competitive industries. This result is intuitive, showing that the impact of import 
competition binds only when an industry is a competitive market. 
In regression (2), we examine whether the mechanism of output tariffs occurs 
through firm exits from the market. An increased level of competition caused by a 
reduction in output tariffs may drive out firms that used to hire more female workers than 
their competitors. We constructed the indicator of whether the number of firms within 4-
digit industries declined more than the average change in the overall manufacturing sector 
in each year. Regression (2) shows that the interaction term between output tariffs and 
industry-level firm exit is significantly negative with a similar magnitude in the 
coefficient of output tariffs. This implies that firms in industries with significant firm exit 
were not affected by output tariffs. Meanwhile, firms in other industries decreased the 
share of female workers to stay in the market in the face of increased competition. 
<Table 6 to be Inserted Here> 
In regressions (3), (4) and (5), we examined whether trade liberalization had any 
combined impact on the share of female workers during the industry-level recession. We 
constructed three indicators showing that employment, output and value added in a 
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specific industry declined more than those of other industries in the same year. Then, we 
controlled all of the indicators’ main terms and their interaction term with output tariffs. 
Regression (2) provides no convincing results that the industry-level decline in 
employment had any combined impact on women’s employment at the plant level. 
Regressions (3) and (4) further show that firms that experienced an industry-level decline 
in output or value added did not experience the impact of a reduction in output tariffs. 
The evidence in this subsection implies that output tariffs hurt women in competitive 
industries without significant firm exit. It also suggests that a reduction in output tariffs 
induced individual firms to replace their female workers with male workers. 
 
4.2 Skill Upgrading, Imported Intermediate Goods, and Exports 
Skill upgrading is a key channel through which technology hurts unskilled 
workers in both developed and developing countries. In this subsection, we examine 
whether firms reacted to trade liberalization by having more non-production workers. On 
average, there are more men than women among non-production workers, and such a 
change in hiring patterns could decrease the relative employment of women. In previous 
literature, Amiti and Konings (2007) and Amiti and Cameron (2012) reported that trade 
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liberalization in Indonesia increased productivity but lowered non-production workers’ 
wage premiums in the 1990s. 
<Table 7 to be Inserted Here> 
Regressions (1) and (2) in Table 7 show that a 10%-point reduction in output 
tariffs increased the share of non-production workers by 0.4% point The magnitude is 
moderate; however, it suggests that part of the reduction in women’s employment found 
in previous empirical evidence is attributed to the hiring of more non-production workers, 
who are mostly men. 
 Another key mechanism suggested by the previous literature is foreign technology 
embedded in imported inputs. Lower input tariffs stimulate demand for imported 
intermediate goods, and higher technology embedded in those imported materials lead 
firms to favor male production workers who, on average, possess higher skill levels. 
In regressions (3) and (4), we examined whether trade liberalization affected 
imported material per worker and domestic material per worker, respectively. The results 
show that output tariffs had no impact on imported materials; however, input tariffs 
among importers had significant and sizable impacts. Regression (3) implies that a 10%-
point reduction in input tariffs increases imported material per worker by 0.283, which is 
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approximately 18 the average level8. In regression (4), a 10%-point reduction in input 
tariffs decreases domestic material per worker by 0.260, implying that firms replaced 
domestic material with imported material. The estimation provides us supporting 
evidence that trade liberalization encourages firms to utilize imported materials with 
foreign technology, which leads them to favor more skilled production workers who are 
more complementary to those intermediate goods. In regression (5), we examine whether 
trade liberalization further facilitates the globalization of manufacturing firms. 
Regression (5) shows that input tariffs have a limited impact on a firm’s probability of 
being an exporter.  
 
5 Robustness Tests 
5.1. External Validity, Minimum Wage, Ownership, and Firm Size 
 Indonesia is a developing country that has experienced rapid change in 
educational attainment, macroeconomic trends, and labor market policies. In this 
                                                          
8 Among importing firms, the average level of imported material per worker throughout 
the sample period is 1.585. The amount of imported material is deflated by the consumer 
price index and in 1,000 Indonesian Rupiah.  
 22 
subsection, we examine whether our estimation results remain robust when we further 
test our results by sub-period, controlling for regional minimum wage and other firm 
characteristics.  
<Table 8 to be inserted here> 
In regressions (1) and (2) of Table 8, we estimate the impact of trade liberalization 
in two periods: the 1990s and the 2000s. In regression (1), all of our previous findings 
remain robust; however, regression (2) shows that our findings in light industry are 
restricted to the 1990s. Regression (3) shows another interesting result: a 10%-point 
reduction in output tariffs induced a 6.4%-point increase in women’s employment in 
heavy industry in the 2000s. At the same time, a reduction in input tariffs had a similar 
impact as it had in light industry in the 1990s; a 10%-point reduction in input tariff was 
associated with a 2.3%-point decline in women’s employment share. 
These results show that the impact of trade liberalization changes as the economy 
develops. In the 1990s, light industry was a major industry that absorbed less-skilled 
female workers. Import competition and imported foreign technology induced by trade 
liberalization hurt female workers, whose average education is far lower than that of male 
workers. In the 2000s, those trends continued into heavy industry, showing that imported 
technology hurts female workers, while increased competition favors them. The empirical 
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evidence suggests that there exists a race between technology and education. When 
female workers in an industry are on average less skilled than male workers, trade 
liberalization hurts female workers. Then, the negative impact moves to more technology-
oriented sectors as women workers catch up with men. 
 In regression (3), we test whether our previous findings remain robust when we 
control for provincial-level minimum wage. Indonesia’s provincial government set its 
own minimum wage, and this wage sharply increased in both the 1990s and the 2000s. 
On average, its nominal term tripled and its real term doubled in both decades. Rama 
(2001) investigated this drastic change in minimum wage9 in Indonesia and found that it 
increased in exchange for a decrease in employment. Our estimation results could have 
been driven by such policy changes if industries that experienced a greater reduction in 
tariffs are geographically concentrated in provinces that implemented greater increases in 
the minimum wage. Regression (3) of Table 8 shows the results controlling for the real 
                                                          
9 To construct the provincial-level minimum wage, we acquired data before 1997 from 
the appendix of Rama (2001) and data after 1997 from the Ministry of Manpower in 
Indonesia. 
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minimum wage and confirms that our previous results are not driven by such omitted 
variable bias. 
 Trade liberalization is often involved in foreign direct investment. As firms owned 
by foreigners tend to have different employment patterns, we restricted our sample to 
domestic private firms in regression (4) of Table 8. Estimated coefficients are the same in 
their sign and similar in their magnitude to previous ones, showing that ownership does 
not affect our results in any direction.  
In regressions (6) and (7), we examined whether the findings from section 4 differ 
across firms with different sizes. We group firms into two categories: small and medium 
firms with fewer than fifty employees and large firms with more than 130 employees. 
The results demonstrate that output tariffs led only small and medium firms to reduce 
female employment due to increased domestic competition. On the other hand, the effects 
of input tariffs exist only for large firms, showing that a 10%-point reduction in input 
tariffs decreases women’s employment by 1.5% point. 
  
5.2. Alternative Specifications, Tariff Measures, and Non-tariff Barriers 
In this subsection, we further corroborate our results by using alternative 
specifications and tariff measures. In regressions (1) and (2) of Table 9, we test robustness 
 25 
by controlling for province-specific linear time trends and non-tariff barriers that started 
to arise in Indonesia in the 2000s. To cross-check our results with the baseline results in 
Table 4, we employed all firms in all industries during the sample period. 
<Table 9 to be inserted here> 
Indonesia is an archipelago country, and each island has its own ethnicity, culture, 
and industry composition. To control for any time-varying characteristics of each 
province, we added province-specific linear time trends in regression (1) of Table 9, and 
our previous results remain robust. In regression (2), we controlled for variables 
indicating whether each industry has any non-tariff barriers (NTBs) reported in the 
UNCTAD TRAINS database. Regression (2) of Table 9 presents that the coefficients 
barely change when we control for NTBs. 
Thus far, we have utilized weighted output tariffs, calculated at the 4-digit industry 
level, and input tariffs, derived from the 172-sector IO table. Our tariff measures are not 
ideal compared to measures employed in Amiti and Konnings (2007), which utilize firm-
level information of inputs available in a 1998 survey and main products to accurately 
identify tariffs that directly affect each firm. 
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In regression (3), we employed Amiti and Konning’s tariff measure with data from 
1993 to 1999 only10. It shows that output tariffs have no impact on firms’ demand for 
female workers, while input tariffs adversely affect female employment with a much 
smaller magnitude. In regression (4), we further controlled for firm fixed effects and 
acquired similar results to regression (3). The difference seems mostly driven by 
differences in the sample period, as our tariff measures also provide such estimation 
results when we restrict the sample period to the 1990s. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 In this paper, we examined how trade liberalization affects women’s employment 
using Indonesia’s Annual Manufacturing Survey from 1993 to 2008. Benefitting from a 
large data set over the long run, we examined two channels through which trade 
liberalization affects employment: import competition caused by a reduction in output 
tariffs and imported technology caused by a reduction in input tariffs.  
                                                          
10 For more analyses using Amiti and Konnings’ tariff measure in 1993 1995, 1997, and 
1999, please refer to Oishi (2018).  
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 We found that both output and input tariffs are associated with a reduction in the 
female employment share among production workers in light industry. Then, we found 
that the channel of output tariffs occurs through competition, where firms did not exit the 
market under heightened pressure. Input tariffs also increased firms’ imported material, 
implying that advanced foreign technology embedded in imported inputs are the channel 
through which trade liberalization hurts female workers. Further robustness tests suggest 
that there exists a race between imported technology and education in Indonesia; a 
reduction in input tariffs disadvantaged female employees in light industry in the 1990s, 
and that effect can be found in heavy industry in 2000s.  
We interpret the results as evidence showing that skill-biased technological bias 
driven by trade liberalization favors more-skilled male workers in developing countries. 
Advanced imported technology favors male workers because they are, on average, more 
complementary to new machine and intermediate goods than female workers. 
Additionally, it is known in the literature that Indonesia’s men and women possess 
different skillsets. According to Newhouse and Suryadarma (2009), in 2007, 63.8% of 
male students in vocational school majored in technical or industrial subjects, but less 
than 5% of female students majored in such areas. Most female students in vocational 
school receive education in simple accounting and tourism.  
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To further investigate this, we will need firm-employee matched data with detailed 
information about their wages and educational attainment. We will leave this for future 
research agendas. Though incomplete, our findings suggest that technology intrinsically 
does not discriminate between male and female workers; however, technology clearly 
favors skilled workers.
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 Output Tariffs and Input Tariffs 
 
 Output tariffs Input tariffs 
Industry 1993 1998 2003 2008 1993 1998 2003 2008 
         
Food and beverages 14.12 6.45 11.07 12.89 19.37 3.30 7.84 14.78 
Textile  27.77 14.03 11.19 12.73 13.34 6.76 1.55 9.08 
Wooden commodities 12.16 6.07 5.20 5.47 15.82 5.85 5.01 6.66 
Paper, printing and publishing 13.78 5.81 3.76 4.11 18.90 4.21 5.44 4.61 
Chemicals, petroleum, and rubber 16.19 10.46 9.33 10.24 10.36 4.41 5.39 7.31 
Metal products, machinery, and 
transportation 20.31 10.46 8.32 8.41 19.81 5.04 4.63 7.01 
 
The reported numbers are the average output tariffs and input tariffs within two-digit industries. 
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Table 2 Women’s Employment Share by Industry 
 1993 2000 2008 
Industry Female  
employment 
share 
Industry 
employment 
share 
Female 
employment 
share 
Industry 
employment 
share 
Female 
employment 
share 
Industry 
employment 
share 
       
Food and beverages 0.493 0.228 0.520 0.212 0.526 0.263 
Textile 0.645 0.320 0.661 0.327 0.684 0.269 
Wooden commodities 0.388 0.124 0.359 0.099 0.359 0.060 
Paper and publishing 0.249 0.040 0.249 0.042 0.243 0.046 
Chemicals, petroleum,  
and rubber 
0.419 0.105 0.382 0.106 0.395 0.116 
Metal products machinery, and 
transportation 
0.262 0.163 0.355 0.193 0.314 0.216 
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Table 3 Summary Statistics: Annual Survey of Manufacturers 
Variables 1993 2000 2008 
Relative wage bill of non-production 
workers 
0.245 
(0.202) 
0.205 
(0.198) 
0.195 
(0.193) 
Share of non-production workers (%) 
15.75 
(15.43) 
14.30 
(15.57) 
15.54 
(16.09) 
Number of workers 
247.13 
(734.54) 
205.84 
(730.36) 
177.98 
(701.23) 
Real value added per worker (in 1,000 Rp) 
0.853 
(7.375) 
0.898 
(7.128) 
1.010 
(15.676) 
Real fixed capital per worker (in 1,000 Rp) 
2.124 
(38.17) 
1.643 
(72.65) 
0.900 
(24.15) 
Real output per worker (in 1,000 Rp) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.032) 
Domestic material per worker (in 1,000 Rp) 
1.069 
(6.802) 
0.901 
(4.577) 
1.274 
(8.611) 
Imported material per worker 
0.303 
(1.723) 
0.347 
(4.386) 
0.340 
(12.428) 
Share of importing firms (%) 19.05 15.17 13.60 
Share of exporting firms (%) 19.88 17.62 17.61 
Observations 10,460 19,203 22,531 
 
Note: The reported numbers are means. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Trade Liberalization and Female Employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     
Non-weighted 
tariff 
      
Output tariff 
0.008** 0.009** 0.008** 0.008** -0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Input tariff 
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Input tariff × 
Importer indicator 
0.036** 0.036** 0.035** 0.035** 0.023** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) 
Importer 
0.017 0.017 0.011 0.011 0.008 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Exporter  
0.059*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Herfindahl index 
less than 0.25 
 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Number of workers 
  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Real fixed capital  
  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Real value added    0.001 0.001 0.001 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Real output    -0.671** -0.671** -0.671** 
   (0.303) (0.303) (0.304) 
Crisis period 
indicator 
   
controlled controlled 
    
      
Observations 208,878 208,878 208,444 208,444 208,444 
R-squared 0.333 0.333 0.335 0.335 0.335 
 
Note: The sample period is from 1993 to 2009, excluding 1997 due to the reliability of the 
tariff data. All tariff measures are deflated by 10; thus, the estimated coefficients represent 
the impact of a 10% change in tariffs. Real fixed capital, real value added, and real output are 
per worker, deflated by 1,000 Rp. All regressions include 4-digit industry fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, and province fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered within four-digit 
industries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5. The Impact of Trade Liberalization by Type of Worker and Industry 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Non-production  
worker 
Production  
worker 
Light 
 industry 
Heavy  
industry 
Capital 
intensive 
Labor intensive 
       
Output tariff 
0.005** 0.007* 0.010*** -0.018*** 0.006* 0.001 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Input tariff 
0.004 0.008 0.007* 0.004 0.008** 0.008* 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) 
Input tariff × Importer 
indicator 
0.000 0.020* 0.021** -0.002 0.011 0.036*** 
(0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.013) 
Importer 
-0.001 0.010 0.042 -0.021** -0.000 0.017 
(0.006) (0.017) (0.026) (0.009) (0.013) (0.023) 
Exporter 
0.006 0.062*** 0.057** 0.052* 0.061*** 0.058*** 
(0.009) (0.017) (0.022) (0.027) (0.015) (0.019) 
       
Observations 176,081 208,406 150,167 58,277 103,976 104,467 
R-squared 0.070 0.339 0.285 0.244 0.325 0.310 
 
Note: See the note for Table 4. Light industry includes food and beverages, textiles, wooden commodities, paper and printing, furniture and 
recycling. Heavy industry includes chemicals, petroleum and rubber, metal products, machinery, and transportation. Capital-intensive firms 
(labor-intensive firms) are defined as firms where real fixed capital per worker deflated by 1,000 is greater than 0.1 (less than 0.1). All 
regressions control for competitiveness (Herfindahl index), the number of workers, per capita level of real fixed capital, real value added, and 
real output. 
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Table 6. The Mechanisms: Industry-level Competition, Firm Exit, and Recession in Light Industry 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Potential 
Mechanism 
Competition firm exit in 
industry 
employment 
decline in industry 
output decline in 
industry 
value added 
decline in industry 
      
Output tariff -0.003 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Output tariff × HH 
0.015**     
(0.006)     
Output tariff × 
recession variable 
 -0.011* -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Input tariff 
0.007** 0.007* 0.006* 0.007* 0.007* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Input tariff × 
Importer indicator 
0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
      
Observations 150,167 150,167 150,167 150,167 150,167 
R-squared 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.302 
 
 
 
Note: The sample is restricted to firms in light industry. See the note for Table 5 regarding the definition of light industry. HH indicates that 
the Herfindahl index is lower than 0.25. All regressions include 4-digit industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, and province fixed effects. 
All regressions control for the number of workers, per capita level of real fixed capital, real value added, real output, and each industry-level 
recession (or competition) variable. Standard errors are clustered within four-digit industries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. The Mechanisms: Skill upgrading, Imported goods, and Exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variables 
non-production 
worker 
non-production 
workers' wage 
bill 
imported 
material/worker 
domestic 
material/worker 
exporter 
      
Output tariff -0.004*** -0.004** 0.008 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) 
Input tariff -0.000 0.000 0.023** -0.027** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) 
Input tariff × Importer 
indicator 
0.001 0.006* -0.248** 0.256** 0.008 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.094) (0.095) (0.014) 
Importer 
0.010 0.038*** 1.137*** -1.240*** 0.193*** 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.262) (0.283) (0.025) 
Exporter 
0.016*** 0.047*** -0.016 -0.025  
(0.004) (0.006) (0.038) (0.033)  
      
Observations 150,167 150,142 150,151 150,151 150,167 
R-squared 0.142 0.148 0.220 0.953 0.205 
 
Note: See the note for Table 6. 
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Table 8. Robustness Test: Pre-/Post-2003, Minimum Wage, Ownership, and Firm Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Light industry 
1990s 
Light industry 
2000s 
Heavy 
industry 
2000s 
minimum 
wage 
domestic 
private firms 
only 
small and 
medium 
firms: E<50 
large firms: 
E>130 
        
Output tariff 0.005** 0.009 -0.064*** 0.008** 0.007* 0.008* -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.014) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Input tariff 0.010* 0.004 -0.015** 0.008* 0.009** 0.010 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
Input tariff × 
Importer indicator 
0.045*** 0.008 0.023** 0.019* 0.015* 0.004 0.015* 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Minimum wage    0.002 0.003   
   (0.005) (0.006)   
Importer 0.021 0.052* -0.029* 0.013 0.013 0.019 -0.008 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.027) (0.012) 
Exporter 0.072*** 0.053** 0.044* 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.034*** 0.019 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) 
        
Observations 61,069 101,379 37,822 208,323 178,833 113,092 49,426 
R-squared 0.302 0.307 0.289 0.335 0.324 0.313 0.522 
 
See the note for Table 6. Minimum wage is province-level minimum wage deflated by the consumer price index. In regressions (4)-(7), we 
use firms in both light and heavy industry during the whole sample period. 
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Table 9. Robustness Test: Alternative Specifications and Tariff Measure 
 Female employment share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   
Tariff measure by Amiti and 
Konning  
Specification 
province-
specific linear 
trends 
non-tariff 
barriers 
1990s 
firm fixed 
effects 
     
Output tariff 
0.007** 0.007** -0.001 -0.002** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Non-tariff barrier 
 0.007   
 (0.005)   
Input tariff 
0.007 0.008* -0.002 0.004* 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) 
Input tariff × 
Importer indicator 
0.016* 0.017* 0.094*** 0.011*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.004) 
Importer 
0.002 0.003 -0.073*** -0.012** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.005) 
Exporter 
0.037** 0.037** 0.056*** 0.005*** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.002) 
     
Observations 195,591 195,591 80,795 76,167 
R-squared 0.341 0.340 0.468 0.925 
 
Note: See the note for Table 6 regarding controls in regressions (1), (2), and (3). Regressions 
(3) and (4) employed tariff rates as calculated by Amiti and Konnings (2007). Regression (4) 
further controlled for wage bills paid to production workers and non-production workers. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
Construction of Tariff Measures 
Output Tariff 
We employed tariff data collected by the UNCTAD Trade Analysis Information System 
(TRAINS). TRAINS provides detailed tariff rates for the 9-digit HS code during our sample 
period. We excluded 1997 tariff data since we found some flaws in the raw data. We used only 
MFN tariff rates, which countries promise to impose on imports from other WTO members 
unless the country is part of other preferential trade agreements, such as in free trade areas or 
customs unions. If additional value-added tax and advance income tax were reported for an 
item, we calculated the sum of all tariff and tax rates. 
 
Weighted output tariff used in most analyses 
We calculated a simple average of tariffs within the 6-digit HS code, which is then matched to 
the volume of imports from US Comtrade to calculate weighted output tariffs within the 4-digit 
ISIC code. The weighted tariffs serve as our main output tariffs measure for analyses. The ISIC 
code from firm data is made by BPS based on ISIC rev.3 but is not entirely identical to it. Due 
to a lack of proper concordance between two codes, we could match only 77% of firms to 
output tariffs. Non-weighted output tariffs were also calculated to check the robustness. 
 
Amiti and Konning’s output tariff measure 
Amiti and Konnings constructed a five-digit output tariff measure by taking a simple average 
of the HS 9-digit codes within each 5-digit industry code. They utilized unpublished 
concordance between the HS 9-digit classification and the 5-digit ISIC from the firm-level data. 
 
Input Tariff 
We employed three waves of IO tables in 1995, 2000, and 2005 provided by BPS (Statistics 
Indonesia) to calculate input tariffs. We created concordance between sector codes in IO tables 
and 4-digit ISIC codes. Using concordance, we created IO tables within 4-digit ISIC codes 
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calculated at buyer’s prices. We used total inputs rather than imported inputs, as tariff rates can 
change the cost of domestic inputs, as well. 
 
Then, we matched tariff rates in 1990-1997 to the IO table in 1995, tariff rates in 1998-2003 to 
the IO table in 2000, and tariff rates in 2004-2009 to the IO table in 2005. We excluded inputs 
from the public sector or domestic sector where there are no valid tariff rates. Then, we 
calculated the input tariff within the 4-digit ISIC code weighted by input shares. Various 
concordances between HS codes and ISIC codes were utilized, which might reduce the 
accuracy of input tariffs and output tariffs. 
The main input tariff measure was constructed using a weighted output tariff. We also 
constructed another input tariff based on alternative output tariff and non-weighted output tariff. 
We also checked the robustness of our results using Amiti and Konning’s input tariff measure. 
The input tariff here is a weighted average of output tariffs, where the weights are the cost 
share of each industry producing each good. The cost share is derived based on detailed input 
information only provided in firm-level data in 1998. 
 
 
 
 
